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INTRODUCTION

Formalities are back in fashion. Their acolytes fall into two camps,
reflecting their different objectives. For formalities, which we shall define as
conditions on the existence or enforcement of copyright, can divest authors
of their rights, or instead enhance authors' exploitation of their works by
alerting their audiences to the authors' claims. For one camp, formalities'
confiscatory consequences, once perceived as barbaric,' are to be celebrated.2
The more works from their authors' rights untimely ripped, cast into the
public domain, or amputated in their enforcement, the better. Formalities can
supply the cure for all copyright's ills, from over-inclusive subject matter, to
over-strong rights and remedies, to over-long duration. Worried that
copyright's low originality threshold embraces shopping lists and such? A
notice requirement will flush out such unworthy scribblings. Scared of strike
suits from obscure authors emerging from the woodwork to claim the latest
hit song, blockbuster film, or bestselling novel as the fruit of their own
inspiration? Locking the courthouse door to the unregistered, or precluding
statutory damages, will keep them and their contingency-fee'd counsel back
behind the wainscoting where they belong. Distressed that copyright's term
just keeps going and going and going? Imposing a renewal obligation early
and often will ensure that only those works whose proprietors truly "care"
1. Comments ofJohn M. Kernochan (1986), reprinted in Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 513 app. B at
685, 689 (1986) ("The present sanction of forfeiture, in particular, is barbaric in its impact
(i.e., it may wipe out the entire value of years of creative effort); it is disproportionate to any
ends served and should be done away with.").
2. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485
(2004); James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 168 (2005);
Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 56 (2006); Martin
Skladany, Unchaining Richelieu's Monster A Tiered Revenue-Based Copyright Regime, 16 STAN.
TECH. L. REv. 131 (2012); 9 . S~verine Dusollier, (Re)Introdudng Formalities in Copyright as a
Strategyfor the Public Domain, in OPEN CONTENT LICENSING: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 75
(Lucie Guibault & Christina Angelopoulos, eds. 2011) (advocating formalities as a means to
opt out of-rather than into-copyright protection).
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about them will get the full copyright term. That copyright-divesting or
-disabling formalities tend in practice to penalize individual creators far more
than corporate copyright owners 3 does not dissuade the forces of formalities,
for authorship has little purchase with these advocates of the formality-fed
public domain.
A second camp enlists formalities to populate not the public domain, but
the public record.4 Notice, registration, and recordation, as declaratory
measures, inform the public of the author's claims and, by facilitating rights
clearance, help the author disseminate and derive compensation from her
work. I prefer to call title-searching information "declaratory measures"
rather than "formalities" because only "formalities," in their Berne
Convention sense (as we shall see), entail the loss of copyright or truncation
of its scope or the limitation of remedies. The aspirations of the second
camp tend toward information rather than confiscation, but many may be
concerned that only the threat of the latter will impel provision of the
former.5
3. Julia D. Mahoney, Lawrence Lessig's Dystopian Vision, 90 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2329-30
(2004) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY

(2004)). Mahoney argues that:
What Lessig neglects to mention is that all formalities impose burdens,
and that those burdens are experienced most keenly by the inexperienced
and uneducated. While it is by no means definite that the costs of more
formalities would outweigh the benefits, Lessig should at least
acknowledge that corporate copyright holders are likely to have a much
easier time negotiating the system than the lone individual creator, and
that a turn to more formalities could bestow an advantage on none other
than the 'Big Media' interests Lessig abhors.
Id. See also Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordeing in
Failitatinga Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 383 n.27 (2005) (noting formalities
"could actually discriminate against individual creators who are unable to carry the burden of
legal counseling and registration'); Brad A. Greenberg, More Than Just a Formality: Instant
Authorship and Copyright's Opt-Out Future in the DigitalAge, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1028, 1048-50
(2012) (discussing costs to individual creators of complying with registration formalities).
4. See, e.g., STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW (2011); Jane C.
Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities:A Love/Hate Relationshp, 33
CoLuM.J.L. & ARTS 311, 316 (2010).
5. See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, 1.3, at 12 (excluding purely voluntary
measures from consideration "because they can produce limited effects only, given that their
compliance relies on goodwill and proactivity on the part of authors and copyright owners");
David Fagundes, Cystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 178-80 (2009) (positing
"orphan works issue" as "an information problem that blocks the functioning of welldefined entitlements" and proposing as a solution "mak[ing] availability of the full panoply
of copyright remedies ... contingent on compliance with registration, notice, and
recordation provisions," such that "[aluthors who fail to comply would still enjoy copyrights,
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The perceived need to give title-searching measures teeth by penalizing
authors who fail to declare or to register their claims allows the rhetoric of
reformalization to conflate formalities' two distinct goals. Recognizing that
the "good cop" face of formalities tied to tide searching may attract more
followers than the "bad cop" function of expropriating authors, some
reformalizers may offer the kinder, gentler rationale of reducing search costs
in support of declaratory obligations whose nonfulfillment will confiscate the
copyright.6 Not all the laments about high transactions costs, however,
withstand analysis. For even were authors easily found and negotiations
simplified, the real problem for many enthusiasts of formalities is having to
transact at all, when, in their view, the object of the proposed transaction
should not, or should no longer, be protected in the first place.7
This Article addresses the Berne Convention's prohibition on the
imposition of "formalities" on the "enjoyment and the exercise" of
copyright,8 and the compatibility with that cornerstone norm of declaratory
but these rights would be enforceable only through a default license so that infringers could
use the work so long as they pay a nominal statutory fee"). But see Ginsburg, supra note 4, at
346 (claiming "[a]n efficient registration system may provide its own best incentive" but
noting "we are not likely to enjoy such a centralized system unless it is adequately staffed and
supported by government funding").
6. See, e.g., Lessig, supranote 2, at 70-71. Lessig states:
[I]f permission is required, then we need a way to know from whom that
permission must be secured. Yet the abolishment of formalities has
removed any easy possibility of knowing. A work is protected whether or
not you can identify who the owner is; it is a felony to use that work in
certain ways, even if there is no one to ask for the permission to use it.
Id.; see also Gibson, supra note 2, at 227-28. Gibson notes:
Perhaps most important, registration could help lower troublesome search
costs. Consider that a potential licensee of a work must incur the expense
of identifying and tracking down the copyright owner before licensing
negotiations can even begin. If the copyright owner's name and address
are not readily available, these search costs might prove prohibitive, even
when the copyright owner would gladly have issued the license for a
reasonable price, or for free. If the law required authors to include their
names in a copyright notice and record any subsequent assignments of
copyright in a public registry, these costs could be avoided or significantly
reduced.
Id. (footnote omitted).
7 See, e.g., Presentation of Fred von Lohmann at 6:47, at the Berkeley Technology Law
Journal Symposium: Reform(aliz)ing Copyright for the Internet Age? (Apr. 18, 2013),
available at http://media.law.berkeley.edu/qtmedia/BCLT/2013copyright/Session2.mp3
(discussing the "dark matter of the Internet").
8. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2),
Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne]. Similar prohibitions exist in
other multilateral conventions to which the United States is a party. See, e.g., Agreement on
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measures to enhance title-searching. In the Berne context, "enjoyment"
means the existence and scope of rights; "exercise" means their enforcement.
Voluntay provision of title-searching information on a public register of
works and transfers of rights is fully consistent with Berne and should be
encouraged. But may a member state impose sanctions or disabilities on
foreign authors for failure to supply that information? I specify "foreign
authors," because the Berne Convention's minimum substantive norms
(including the no-formalities rule) do not apply to domestic authors in the
work's country of origin.9 So, in theory, the United States could go back to
punishing its own authors by reenacting notice and registration requirements
whose nonobservance will deprive the work of protection or render any
rights unenforceable. But this theory breaks down under two pressures. One
is political, for a member state may not long treat its own creators much
worse than foreigners. The other is practical, as digital media facilitate
manipulation of a work's country of origin through remote first publication
in a country less benighted than the author's residence. 10 Most of the
prescriptions this Article offers will therefore apply equally to U.S. and to
foreign works.
Part II of this Article will address conditions on the existence or
enforcement of rights. It concludes that "formalities" prerequisite to the
initial attachment or persistence of protection, or that limit the scope of
minimum rights or the availability of remedies, violate the norms of Berne
and subsequent multilateral instruments. By contrast, it may be permissible to
condition Berne-plus subject matter or rights on compliance with declaratory
measures. The Berne-plus path, however, risks descending into controversies
of characterization, as one contender's "plus" proves another's "minimum"
norm.
Part III of this Article will consider declaratory measures regarding
ownership of rights under copyright. The Berne Convention generally does
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property art. 9(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS] ("Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne
Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto."); WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 1(4), Dec. 20,
1996 (extending protection to computer programs and databases: "Contracting Parties shall
comply with Articles 1 to 21 and the Appendix of the Berne Convention."); WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 20, Dec. 20, 1996 (extending protection to sound
recordings and certain performances: "The enjoyment and exercise of the rights provided
for in this Treaty shall not be subject to any formality."); see also Beijing Treaty on
Audiovisual Performances art. 17, June 24, 2012 (extending protection to audiovisual
fixations of performances and certain unfixed performances: "The enjoyment and exercise
of the rights provided for in this Treaty shall not be subject to any formality.").
9. See Berne, supra note 8, art. 5(3).
10. Id. art. 5(4) (defining the "country of origin" of a work).
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not cover copyright ownership, and one may urge that conditions on who
may enjoy or exercise rights are a matter distinct from disabilities imposed on
existence or enforcement in general. Accordingly, requiring transferees to
provide information pertaining to the transfer of rights, and imposing
sanctions for noncompliance, should be Berne-compatible. Specifically, I
propose making the validity of a transfer of copyright depend on the
transferee's recordation in the Copyright Office of the contract or "a note or
memorandum of the transfer"" containing sufficient information to permit
third parties to ascertain who owns what rights in the work. 12 Part III then
endeavors to resolve some of the practical problems a mandatory recordation
of transfer obligation might engender. These include time limits for
recording the transfer, gaps in the tide-searching record, and effect on
transfers of rights in non-U.S. works when the United States is one of the
territories covered by the grant.
II.

EXISTENCE AND ENFORCEMENT

A.

HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE BERNE No-FORMALITIES
RULE

From the outset of the mid-nineteenth century movement for
international copyright, authors advocated the abolition or restriction of
formalities. In the nineteenth century, to obtain protection at home and
abroad, an author would have needed to comply with the formalities of each
country in which he sought protection-assuming the country of which the
author was not a national extended any protection at all to foreign
claimants." Proper compliance was cumbersome, costly, and often
unsuccessful, hence authors' demand as early as the first international
Congress aimed at securing authors' rights, held in Brussels in 1858, that
authors be protected in all countries so long as they satisfied whatever

11. Cf 17 U.S.C. 5 204(a) (2012) (validity of a transfer dependent on writing signed by
transferor). While the transferee could record the entire contract, concerns for
confidentiality of information concerning price and non-copyright aspects of the agreement
might warrant recording something less than the entire contract-so long as the document
contains information essential to rights-clearance. See Copyright Office, Library of Congress,
Notice of Policy Decision on Recordation of Documents, 70 Fed. Reg. 44049, part 3 (Aug.
1, 2005), available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2005/70fr44049.html; 37 C.F.R.
201.4(c)(2) (2013); Compendium II: Copyright Office Practices § 1610, available at
http://www.copyright.gov/compendium/1600.htm.
12. 17 U.S.C. 5 205 permits but does not require recordation of contracts of transfer.
13. SAN RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND
1.19, 1.40 (2006).
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formalities their home countries imposed. The 1886 and 1896 versions of the
Berne Convention adopted this approach. 4
In practice, however, it turned out to be difficult to prove to foreign
authorities that the author had complied with the country of origin's
formalities.'" As a result, the 1908 Berlin revision prohibited the imposition
of formalities on foreign authors altogether, although member states
remained free to require that domestic authors affix notice, register claims,
and/or deposit copies with local authorities. 6 And, to ensure that an author's
failure to carry out domestic formalities-with a consequent loss of
protection in the country of origin-would not affect the availability of
international protection, the Berlin revisers specified that "apart from the
provisions of this Convention, the extent of protection, as well as the means
of redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed
exclusively by the laws of the country where protection is claimed."'" The
effect of this language was to confer copyright throughout the Berne Union,
automatically and upon creation, on every Convention-covered work created
by an author who was a national of a Berne Union member state, or first
published within a member state. The no-formalities rule thus fundamentally
undergirds the Berne Convention system of universal international authors'
rights.
But what are "formalities" in the Berne sense? Article 5(2) declares that
"the enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality."' 8 Although earlier texts refer to "conditions and formalities," it
has long been understood that the term "any formality" encompasses both
"formal and material conditions" on the existence or enforcement of rights. 9
"These rights" are "the rights which the[] respective laws [of the countries of
the Union] do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the
rights specially granted by this Convention., 2' Thus, a foreign author is
entitled to national treatment in Berne member states (but without having to
comply with any formalities the state may impose on its own authors), as well
as to any additional Convention-guaranteed rights, even if these are not
afforded to local authors.

14. Id.

6.102-.103, 6.83-.85.

15. Id. 6.86-.87.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. 3.12, 6.87.
Berne, supra note 8, art. 5(2) (art. 4(2) in the Berlin revision).

Id.
Seegeneral/y RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supranote 13,
Berne, supra note 8, art. 5(1).

6.102-.104.
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The "enjoyment" of local or Berne minimum rights extends to
" 'everything which must be complied with in order to ensure that the rights
of the author with regard to his work may come into existence.' These would
include such requirements as registration, the deposit or filing of copies, the
payment of fees, or the making of declarations.' In addition to the initial
attachment of protection (since 1908 automatic upon creation for authors
from other Berne member states), the concept of "enjoyment" of copyright
would include the persistence of protection for the minimum Berne term of
copyright; obligations to register and renew copyrights thus would fall under
the prohibition. 2 The scope of rights (including any limitations or
exceptions) also comes within the "enjoyment" of Berne and national
rights. 23 A member state may neither condition the initial attachment of
copyright on compliance with formalities nor subsequently deny coverage of
particular rights to authors who fail to meet declaratory obligations. Thus, for
example, a member state may not make the adaptation right 24 subject to
registering the work or filing a notice of reservation of rights.
Berne precludes not only formalities that condition the existence of
copyright, but also those that freight its "exercise.,' 2 Without the second
prohibition, an author might be vested with copyright, but unable to enforce her
rights unless she complies with a variety of prerequisites to suit or to
availability of remedies. 26 Copyright-specific conditions on access to judicial
process or to injunctive relief (including seizure and destruction of infringing
articles) or to actual damages therefore contravene Berne norms. By contrast,
general litigation obligations, such as payment of filing fees, or general
procedural or evidentiary requirements, while they may affect the
enforcement of a copyright claim, are not "formalities" in the Berne sense so
long as they apply to all actions, whatever the subject matter.27 Beyond these
21. RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, 6.103 (quoting the German delegate
Meyer at the 1884 Diplomatic Conference, Acres 1884).
22. See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, at 195.
23. In addition to art 5(1)'s command that "[a]uthors shall enjoy" rights under national
law and under Berne minima, Berne arts. 11, l1bis, liter, 12, and l4bis all provide that
"authors shall enjoy" the specific minimum rights to public performance, adaptation, and
cinematographic works.
24. Berne, supra note 8, art. 12 ("Authors of literary or artistic works shall enjoy the
exclusive right of authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other alterations of their
works.').
25. Berne, supranote 8, art. 5(2).
26. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, 5.3.2, at 200 ("[lit seems that the word 'exercise' was
added so as to elucidate that the prohibition did not only cover constitutive formalities, but
also formalities that are prerequisites to sue.").
27. Arguably, the 17 U.S.C. 5 512(c) (2012) system of notice and takedown could be
considered a "formality" because notice is a prerequisite to relief. Nonetheless, the argument
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general observations, specific issues concerning the Berne-compatibility of
declaratory obligations that condition the enforcement of rights warrant
fuller development in the next Section.
B.

DECLARATORY OBLIGATIONS GOING TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF
RIGHTS

1. PermissibleConditions
Not every "condition" on the existence or enforcement of protection is a
prohibited "formality." For example, under Berne article 3, a work will not
be protected in the Union unless its author's nationality or its place of first
publication meets the condition of being a Berne member state. Article 2(2)
allows member states to make fixation in material form a condition of
protection. Once a work does qualify for protection under the Convention,
however, member states may not impose declaratory or other conditions
precedent to the enjoyment or exercise of national and conventional rights.
There is a possible exception: with respect to works still under copyright in
their countries of origin, but in the public domain in a newly-acceding
member state (or still under copyright in the new member state, but in the
public domain in other member states), article 18(1) requires member states
to restore the copyrights in these works, but article 18(3) allows member
states to determine "the conditions of application of [the restoration]
principle."
A member state may not decline to restore copyrights in qualifying
foreign works in the local public domain: article 18(3) makes clear that the
restoration principle must be applied. But that provision grants member
states considerable latitude to determine how to restore copyright in formerly
public domain foreign works. "Conditions" on the implementation of
restoration might well include declaratory obligations. For example, section
104A of the U.S. copyright law reinstates copyright automatically2 8 but
is unpersuasive because the information that § 512(c)(3) requires is not a condition precedent
to seeking relief akin to the § 411 pre-suit registration obligation, but corresponds to what
one would have to prove in court. The requirements that, in a civil action, the author prove
that she is the author, that she created the work, that she published it on a particular date,
and that the work is original, are not "formalities," but are the facts at issue. Berne art. 5(2)
does not dispense the author from proving those facts in the proceeding that will determine
if she is entitled to relief. It means that the author need not register a document attesting to
those facts before she can even initiate a procedure to seek relief (at which she will have to
prove the facts). Transposed to § 512(c)(3), the facts in the notice are the facts that must be
pleaded to obtain the temporary restraining order-like remedy of a takedown. They are the
procedure, they are not a screen barring the author from access to the process.
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(1)(A) (2012) ("Copyright subsists, in accordance with this
section, in restored works, and vests automatically on the date of restoration.").
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protects "reliance parties" who had exploited the work in good faith before
its restoration, by requiring restored copyright owners to file a "Notice of
Intent to Enforce Restored Copyright" in the Copyright Office or by service
on the reliance party.29 In other words, before she may enforce her copyright
against a reliance party, the author or copyright owner of a formerly public
domain work must comply with a detailed declaratory obligation 3 inorder to
put reliance parties on notice of the restored owner's claims. By virtue of
article 18(3), this declaratory obligation, albeit a significant limitation on the
enforcement of copyright, seems fully compatible with Berne norms.
2. Incentives Versus Obligations: Rewarding the Effectuation of Declaratoy
Measures by Offering i'tigation or Remedial Enhancements
If Berne prohibits the imposition of sanctions for noncompliance with
declaratory obligations, another approach might be to substitute carrots for
sticks. Authors who comply with registration or other requirements might
enjoy evidentiary advantages or qualify for additional remedies.
a) Evidentiary Advantages
Evidentiary advantages might provide meaningful incentives to authors
or rightholders to register their works and record transfers of rights, thus
facilitating title searching. For example, according presumptive probative
value to the publicly-recorded information if the registration or recordation is
made within a certain period 3' may encourage compliance with these
declaratory measures. Making timely registration prima facie evidence of a
work's originality, thus placing the burden on the defendant to prove lack of
authorship, may further stimulate registrations.32

29. Id.§ 104A(c).
30. Id.§ 104A(e) (setting out the details).
31. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. 5 410(c) (certificate of registration serves as prima facie proof of
information there recorded, if registration is effected within five years of publication); 17
U.S.C. 5 412 (statutory damages and attorneys fees available only if work registered before
infringement occurred, "unless ...registration is made within three months after the first
publication of the work"); see PreparatoryDocumentfor the First Session of the Committee of Experts
on a Possible Instrument on the Protection of the Ri'ghts of Petformers and Producers of Phonograms
(Geneva, June 28 to July 2 1993), 1993 COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REVIEW OF THE WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO) 142, 154,
73-76 (permissibility of
laws giving registration information the effect of a rebuttable presumption of the correctness
of the information). Reinbothe & von Lewinski indicate that measures to "facilitate proof of
authorship" are not prohibited formalities. See J6rg Reinbothe & Silke von Lewinski, THE
WIPO TREATIES 1996, at 61, 27 (2002).
32. There may be extra-copyright incentives as well. See, e.g., Nat'l Peregrine, Inc. v.
Capitol Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Denv. (In re Peregrine Entm't, Ltd.), 116 B.R. 194, 197,
201-02 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that "a security interest in a copyright [must be] perfected
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b) Remedial Advantages
Berne's prohibition on formalities requires that the basic copyright
remedies, such as injunctive relief and actual damages, remain available to
foreign authors who have not locally registered their works or undertaken
other locally-imposed declaratory measures. Although the Berne Convention
itself specifies no remedies other than border seizures of infringing copies,33
Berne anticipates that member states will supply the "means of redress."34
These are determined by local law,3" but, over and above the national
treatment rule, they remain subject to the overall no-formalities proviso. It
has been suggested that Berne does not in fact require member states to
include injunctive relief within their remedial arsenals, and that member
states might therefore condition that remedy on compliance with declaratory
measures, leaving undeclaring authors with some form of equitable
remuneration in lieu of injunctions.3 6
This contention ignores a great deal, notably copyright history, the text of
the Berne Convention, and the explicit requirement of the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") that member states
provide injunctive relief from copyright infringement.37 First, Berne's
delegation to member states' laws to provide the means of redress occurred
against a background of widespread (probably universal) domestic provision
of injunctive relief. Indeed orders prohibiting reproduction and distribution,
backed up by confiscation of infringing books (and even type fonts), date to
the earliest days of copyright and before. For example, the first international
copyright treaty, the Convention between the Kingdom of Sardinia and the
Austrian Empire, of May 22, 1840, mandated:
[O]ver and above the penalties pronounced against infringers by
the laws of the two States, the sequester and destruction of the
by an appropriate fiding with the United States Copyright Office," rather than "a UCC-1
financing statement filed with the relevant secretary of state," because "any state recordation
system pertaining to interests in copyrights would be preempted by the Copyright Act"). But
see Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where IntellectualProperty and Commerial Law Collide, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1680-95 (1996) (criticizing In re Peregrine for conflating security
interests in copyright-related receivables with such interests in copyrights themselves); see also
Patrick R. Barry, Note, Software Copyrights as Loan Collateral-Evaluaing the Reform Proposals,46
HASTINGS L.J. 581, 589-90 (1995) ("The second part of [In re Peregrine's]ruling, which holds
that security interests in accounts receivable can only be perfected by recordation with the
Copyright Office, is more questionable and has been criticized by commentators.").
33. Berne, supra note 8, art. 16.
34. Id.
art. 5(2).
35. Id.
36. Sprigman, supra note 2, at 555-60.
37. TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 41(1), 44(1), 46.
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copies of the infringing articles, as well as the molds, the prints, the
copper plates, the lithographing stones, and all other objects
employed to commit the infringement, shall be ordered.38
The first copyright act, the British Statute of Anne (1710), provided that the
"offender or offenders shall forfeit such Book or Books and all and every
sheet or sheets being part of such Book or Books to the proprietor or
proprietors of the copy thereof who shall forthwith damask and make waste
paper of them."3 9 And before copyright, sixteenth-century papal printing
privileges systematically charged the executing magistrates to confiscate
books printed, sold, or imported without the author's or publisher's
permission.4 °
Second, while Berne does not specify remedies, it does impose detailed
conditions on the availability of compulsory licenses. A member state may
not substitute an equitable compensation remedy for actual damages or
injunctive relief unless, with respect to the reproduction right, the remedy
passes the "three-step test '41 or, with respect to certain communications to
the public, meets the criteria of article 1I bis(2). Were injunctive relief not the
norm, there would be no need to specify when a member state may
substitute a monetary remedy. The TRIPS Agreement has generalized the
application of the three-step test to limitations on rights not already
addressed in the Berne Convention. 42 The third step (the limitation "does not

38. Convenzione fra 1' Austria il Piemonte lo Stato Pontificio, la Toscana e i Ducati di
Modena, Parma e Lucca in data 22 Marzo 1840, e in diverse epoche accettata dai suddetti
Governi e tacitamente prorogata [Bilateral Treaty between Austria and Sardinia] art. XVI,
Austria-Sardinia, Mar. 22, 1840 ("Oltre le pene pronunciate contro ai contraffattori dale
leggi dei due Stati, si ordinerA i sequestro e la distruzione degli esemplari e degli oggetti
contrafratti, e cosi pure delle forme, stampe, dei rami, delle pietre, e degli altri oggetti
adoperati per eseguire la contraffazione .... ."), available at http://copy.law.cam.ac.uk/cam/
pdf/d_1840_l.pdf. On the Austro-Sardinian Convention in general, see Laura Moscati, II
caso Pomba-Tasso e Papplicawione della prima convenione internazionale sulla propriet intellettuale, in
MIMLANGES EN L'HONNEUR D'ANNE LEFEBVRE-TEILLARD 747, 754-57 (Paris 2009).
39. The Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 2.
40. See generallyJane C. Ginsburg, Proto-Properyin L"teragy and Artistic Works: 16th Centuy
PapalPriningPrivileges, 36 CoLUM.J.L. & ARTS 345 (2013).
41. Berne, supra note 8, art. 9(2) (setting forth the test: (1) a "certain special case[]"
which (2) "does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work" and (3) "does not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author").
42. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 13; accord Panel Report, United States-Section 110(5) of the
6.80-.81, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Section 110(5)
US Copyright Act,
Panel Report] ("[N]either the express wording nor the context of Article 13 or any other
provision of the TRIPS Agreement supports the interpretation that the scope of application
of Article 13 is linited to the exclusive rights newly introduced under the TRIPS
Agreement" and thus "appl[ying] Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement to the rights provided
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unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author") may permit a
member state to limit relief to equitable remuneration,4 3 but only if the
remedy is limited to "certain special cases" that "do[] not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work." 44 It would be perverse, to say the least,
were noncompliance with formalities to qualify as a "special case" under the
three-step test, thus enabling member states to evade the no-formalities rule
by making nonfulfillment of formalities the gateway to compulsory licensing.
This gambit thus has the "merit" of violating not one but two Berne norms.
Finally, even if Berne did not presume the default remedy of injunctive
relief, TRIPS clearly obliges member states to provide for injunctions. In
addition to requiring compliance with articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention
(thus including the no-formality rule),4" TRIPS specifies:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in
this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective
action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights
covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to
prevent infringements 46and remedies which constitute a deterrent to
further infringements.

under Articles 11(1) and 11bis(1) of the Berne Convention (1971) as incorporated into the
TRIPS Agreement.").
43. See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 42, 6.229 (finding "prejudice to the
legitimate interests of rightholders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception or limitation
causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright holder"
and citing WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention for proposition that "where there would
be serious loss of profit for the copyright owner, the law should provide him with some
compensation (a system of compulsory licensing with equitable remuneration)." (quoting
WORLD INTELlECTUAL PROP. ORG., GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS AcT, 1971) 9.8 (1978))).

44. See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 42,
6.112, .183, which finds that
article 13's treatment of "certain special cases" "requires that a limitation or exception in
national legislation should be clearly defined and should be narrow in its scope and reach"
and that:
[A]n exception or limitation to an exclusive right in domestic legislation
rises to the level of a conflict with a normal exploitation of the work... if
uses, that in principle are covered by [the exclusive right owned] but
exempted under the exception or limitation, enter into economic
competition with the ways that right holders normally extract economic
value from that right to the work ...and thereby deprive them of
significant or tangible commercial gains.
Id.; see also TRIPS, supranote 8, art. 13 (using conjunctive "and" when listing test elements).
45. TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 9(1).
46. Id. art. 41(1).
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The "enforcement procedures as specified in this Part" include
"order[ing] a party to desist from an infringement., 47 TRIPS provides for
two other remedies related to injunctive relief: border control of piratical
copies48 and destruction of infringing articles. 49 As a result, if ever there had
been any ambiguity as to a member state's power to condition the availability
of injunctive relief on fulfillment of formalities, TRIPS forecloses any such
option. Arguably, TRIPS merely requires that member states' courts have
authority to impose injunctions, not that they in fact exerise that authority.
Textual sophistry aside, given the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement to
"ensure" effective enforcement of intellectual property rights, to read TRIPS
as merely giving member states an option, rather than imposing an
obligation, to provide for injunctive relief seems self-defeating.0 "[S]hall have
47. Id. art. 44(1) ("The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party to
desist from an infringement...
48. Article 44(1) provides:
[1lnter alia to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce in their
jurisdiction of imported goods that involve the infringement of an
intellectual property right, immediately after customs clearance of such
goods. Members are not obliged to accord such authority in respect of
protected subject matter acquired or ordered by a person prior to
knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that dealing in such
subject matter would entail the infringement of an intellectual property
right.
Id.
49. Article 46 provides:
In order to create an effective deterrent to infringement, the judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order that goods that they have
found to be infringing be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of
outside the channels of commerce in such a manner as to avoid any harm
caused to the right holder, or, unless this would be contrary to existing
constitutional requirements, destroyed. The judicial authorities shall also
have the authority to order that materials and implements the
predominant use of which has been in the creation of the infringing goods
be, without compensation of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of
commerce in such a manner as to minimize the risks of further
infringements.
Id. art. 46.
50. See, e.g., DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND

ANALYsIs
2.510, .529 (4th ed. 2012) (summarizing article 41 (1)'s "shall ensure" mandate
as "insist[ing] on the effectiveness of action, including expeditious remedies to prevent
infringement," and explaining that "a systematic refusal ... to apply [required judicial]
powers may constitute nullification or impairment"); see also id. 2.540 (addressing TRIPS
article 44(2) permission to limit remedies to monetary relief in the case of remedies against
governments; TRIPS's toleration of sovereign immunity from injunctive relief underscores
the general mandate to provide injunctive relief against non-government infringers); TRIPS,
supra note 8, art. 31 (authorizing, solel with respect to patents, "adequate remuneration" in
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authority" allows member states to apply their general criteria for awarding
injunctive relief (for example, conditioning the remedy on a showing of
inadequacy of monetary relief 1), but those criteria cannot be so restrictive as
routinely to result in the denial of injunctions, otherwise member states could
eviscerate TRIPS's mandate to provide for injunctive relief.5 2 By the same
token, a member state may not systematically withhold injunctive relief
simply because the author or rightholder has not complied with copyright
formalities, otherwise it would reintroduce through the back door a
restriction barred by TRIPS's incorporation of Berne norms.
c) Other "Incentives": Remedies in Excess of TRIPS Minima, Such
as Statutory Damages and Attorney's Fees
If Berne and TRIPS preclude conditioning express or implicit
conventional minimum remedies on fulfillment of formalities, might member
states create incentives for compliance with declaratory measures by
subjecting additional remedies to a compliance obligation? In other words,
might there be a category of Berne-plus remedies for which imposition of
formalities would be permissible? When the United States joined the Berne
Convention in 1989, it retained the provision in the Copyright Act that
limited availability of statutory damages and attorney's fees to works that had
been registered before the infringement occurred. 3 This provision was
thought to afford meaningful incentives to registration that are "compatible
with Berne since it deals with certain specific remedies rather than the ability
to obtain redress at all."5 4 In general, the argument holds that remedies that
exceed the protections mandated by international instruments are not subject
to the Berne minima no-formalities rule. So long as the member state
requires its own authors to comply with any declaratory obligations, then
imposing the same obligations on foreign authors remains consistent with
the rule of national treatment. Berne neither addresses nor, arguably, assumes

certain highly detailed instances of "use by the government or of third parties authorized by
the government.").
51. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (discussing
criteria for awarding injunctive relief).
52. Thanks to Professor Susy Frankel for this point.
53. Pub. L. 94-553, Title I, § 101, 90 Stat. 2583 (1976) (amended 1990, 2005, and 2008;
current version at 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012)).
54. FinalReport of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 565 (1986); see also FootballAss'n PremierLeague v. Youtube, 633
F.Supp.2d 159, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that
Section 412 ... 'do[es] not condition the availability of all meaningful relief on registration,
and therefore [is] not inconsistent with Berne.'" (citing S. Rep. No. 100-352, at 14-15)
(1988)).
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availability of statutory damages and attorney's fees; TRIPS includes these
measures among its specified remedies, but it does not require member states
to provide them.55 It might follow that conditioning the availability (to local
and foreign authors alike) of these remedies on some act of public filing is
both Berne- and TRIPS-compatible.
Berne- and TRIPS-compatibility, however, should turn on assessment
whether the "plus" remedies are in fact extra frills, or instead are necessary to
effective enforcement of copyright. TRIPS article 41(1) provides: "Members
shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are
available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of
56
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement.
One might contend that, given the high costs of litigation and the difficulty
(and cost) of proving actual damages, a copyright claimant cannot as a
practical matter effecfivey enforce her rights in the United States without the
prospect of statutory damages and attorney's fees. The claim, which may well
be plausible, would benefit from empirical demonstration.
In the absence of such a showing, these remedies remain optional under
TRIPS. Notably, TRIPS article 45(2) provides that "members may authorize
the judicial authorities to order recovery of profits and/or payment of
preestablished damages even where the infringer did not knowingly, or with
reasonable grounds to know, engage in infringing activity." Contrasting
article 41(1) ("members shall ensure") with article 45(2) ("may authorize the
judicial authorities"), it does not appear that TRIPS mandates the availability
of statutory damages ("pre-established damages"). Non-U.S. authors may
have a somewhat stronger, but ultimately unsuccessful, claim that attorney's
fees figure among the minimum remedies that TRIPS member states must
afford. Article 45(2) also states that "the judicial authorities shall also have
the authority to order the infringer to pay the rightholder expenses, which
may include appropriate attorney's fees." The "have the authority" language
echoes that of article 44(1), which I have said, together with article 41(1)
requires member states to provide for formality-free injunctive relief.57 But
while article 45(2) may oblige member states to award court costs to a
prevailing plaintiff, the award of attorney's fees remains permissive ("may
include").58
The non-mandatory character of these remedies, however, does not
necessarily mean that a member state that chooses to include them may also
55.
56.
57.
58.

TRIPS, spra note 8, arts. 44(1), 45(2); see infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 41(1) (emphasis added).
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
TRIPS, supra note 8, art. 45(2) (emphasis added).
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condition them on compliance with formalities. Structurally, one may
contend that all of the TRIPS provisions pertaining to copyright, whether
substantive or remedial, are subject to the overarching no-formalities rule by
virtue of TRIPS's incorporation of Berne's norms.5 9 As a result, even
optional remedies may not be conditioned on compliance with formalities.6 °
At first blush, TRIPS's text might rebut such a conclusion. Under TRIPS
article 9(1), "Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne
Convention." TRIPS article 2(2) specifies, "Nothing in Parts I to IV of this
Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have
to each other under ...the Berne Convention." If TRIPS creates a new
obligation or, in the case of statutory damages and attorney's fees, a new
option, how do attendant formalities "derogate" from existing duties?
Similarly, the requirement to "comply with" the Berne Convention may not
mean that the cited articles of the Berne Convention condition TRIPS
substantive norms that fall outside the scope of the Berne Convention. Berne
article 5(1) establishes that the duty of national treatment does extend to new
rights and remedies that TRIPS member states implement in their national
laws, because the Berne norm covers "the rights which [Union members']
respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals."'" Thus, a
TRIPS member could not, for example, provide formality-free statutory
damages to its own authors while requiring foreign authors to have registered
their works as a prerequisite to obtaining that remedy. But if the TRIPS
member imposes the formal prerequisite on local and foreign rightholders
alike, it is not clear that it will have "failed to comply with" articles of a treaty
that do not incorporate optional remedies.62
Ultimately, however, arguments based on the optional or mandatory
character of the remedy under TRIPS miss the mark. As discussed earlier,
Berne does not explicitly incorporate any remedies, other than border
seizures. The "existing [Berne Convention] obligation" from which TRIPS
does not derogate pertains not to any particular remedy, but to a member
state's remedial scheme as a whole. We have posited that member states may
not condition the basic remedy of injunctions (nor, for that matter, actual
damages) on compliance with formalities because such a limitation would
59. TRIPS, supra note 8, arts. 2(2), 9(1).
60. Thanks to Professor Susy Frankel for this point.
61. Berne, supra note 8, art. 5(1) (emphasis added).
62. By contrast, protection for the additional copyright subject matter of TRIPS's
article 10 (computer programs and databases) cannot be conditioned on formalities, because
article 10(1) explicitly treats software as Berne subject matter, and article 10(2) adopts the
"intellectual creations" formula from Berne article 2(5), thus also arguably inserting original
databases into Berne, rather than establishing them as outside Berne.
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effectively eviscerate the no-formalities rule: a right cannot be "exercised" if
it cannot be enforced. But nothing in the Berne text authorizes distinctions
among types of "exercise" that cannot be subjected to compliance with
formalities. On the contrary, Article 5(2) equates "enjoyment and exercise"
of Berne minima and national treatment rights with "the extent of
protection, as well as the means of redress." Member states' freedom to
determine the "means of redress," including by devising remedies additional
to the basic forms of monetary and injunctive relief, does not entitle them to
selective adherence to the no-formalities rule. Suppose, for example, that a
member state provided expedited judicial or administrative process for
copyright infringement claims, but only if the rightholder had registered the
work before the alleged infringement occurred. This procedural advantage,
albeit innovative and perhaps unique to that member state, is nonetheless a
"means of redress." The Berne-plus remedies argument thus rests on a
fundamental fallacy. Article 5(2) does not distinguish between traditional or
basic remedies and additional, unusual, or new remedies: all remedies come
within "the means of redress." Under this reading, there is no such thing as a
Berne-plus remedy, and therefore no basis to impose formalities on the
availability of some remedies but not others.
C.

OTHER BERNE-PLUS APPROACHES

If there are no Berne-plus remedies on which to condition compliance
with declaratory measures, are there nonetheless other aspects of copyright
to which a Berne-plus approach might apply? For example, conditions on
Berne-plus subject matter, duration, and rights might all fall outside the noformality rule (assuming, for purposes of the rule of national treatment, that
63
local authors also incurred the same duties ).
1. Subject Matter
Article 2 of the Berne Convention sets out
member states must protect. Notably absent are
Berne's coverage of computer programs and
ambiguous. 64 But those gaps have been filled by

the subject matter that
sound recordings. And
databases is arguably
other treaties that also

63. Beme-plus subject matter, rights, and remedies that come within the ambit of the
TRIPS Agreement remain subject to national treatment and most-favored-nation ("MFN ' )
obligations. See Susy Frankel, Challenging TRIPS-Plus Agreements. The Potential Uti,6y of NonViolation Disputes, 12 J. INT'L EcON. L. 1023, 1031-32 (2009).
64. On computer programs, see SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT
LAW AND POLIcY 7.13, at 232 (2008). von Lewinski argues that:
The question of whether computer programs are covered as 'works' under
the Berne Convention and, consequently, benefit from national treatment
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incorporate the no-formalities proviso. 6 ' There are, however, two categories
of article 2 works that are susceptible to Berne-compatible declaratory
obligations. Article 2(4) provides, "it shall be a matter for legislation in the
countries of the Union to determine the protection to be granted to official
texts of a legislative, administrative and legal nature, and to official
translations of such texts."
Berne thus permits member states to exclude official texts altogether
from the subject matter of copyright: the phrase "determine the protection"
may also be understood to authorize the coverage of official texts, but
subject to various conditions, such as declaratory obligations.
Article 2(7) allows member states:
to determine the extent of the application of their laws to works of
applied art and industrial design and models, as well as the
conditions under which such works, designs and models shall be
protected. Works protected in the country of origin solely as
designs and models shall be entitled in another country of the
Union only to such special protection as is granted in that country
to designs and models; however, if no such special protection is
granted in that country, such works shall be protected as artistic
works.
This rather convoluted provision6 6 allows member states to separate
works of applied art from other artistic works and to prescribe a distinct
(non-copyright) regime in which formalities might feature.6" Article 2(7)
derogates from the general conventional rule of independence of
international protection from the existence of protection in the country of
origin, because article 2(7) provides that if the country of origin protects
applied art only under a non-copyright regime, then Union countries may
similarly restrict the protection of the foreign work of applied art. Thus, if
the country of origin covers a work of applied art only by means of a design
patent (hence, through a mandatory registration system), other Berne

and minimum rights, is not easy to answer; indeed, for some time after the
emergence of computer programs, views were quite divergent and no
authentic interpretation could be ascertained.
8.92-.103, at
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also 1 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13,
491-97 (arguing that computer programs fall within Berne subject matter both on first
principles and as a matter of state practice). On databases, see id. 8.88-91, at 489-91
(arguing that Berne subject matter includes original compilations of data).
65. See treaties cited supra note 8.
66. For its history, see, for example, 1 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13,
8.59-.69, at 453-69.
67. See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, 5.1.2.2, at 170.
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members may also require that the work be registered (and comply with
other prerequisites). But, if the country of origin protects applied art under
copyright or if the Berne member where protection is sought does not have a
special regime for applied art, the Berne member must accord formality-free
copyright protection to the work of applied art. As a result, whether Berne
members may impose formalities on works of applied art depends on the
nature of protection in the country of origin.
2. Duration
We have noted that formalities, such as renewal registrations, that
condition the duration of copyright during the Berne minimum term violate
article 5(2).68 But member states might institute mandatory renewal
obligations after the lapse of the Berne minimum term. Thus, a member state
with a life-plus-seventy term might condition domestic and foreign authors'
enjoyment of the extra twenty years on a renewal filing. Moreover, if the
term of protection in the country of origin is shorter than the term in the
country of protection (for example, life-plus-fifty), then the rule of national
treatment does not apply, and member states may either deny the last twenty
years of protection altogether6 9 or impose renewal obligations on foreign
0
works, so long as they also required the same of local authors.
Consider the following concrete example. The Berne minimum term for
cinematographic works is fifty years from first making available to the public
with the consent of the author.7 ' For pre-1978 works, the U.S. term of
protection is ninety-five years from publication, as it is for works made for
hire created as of 1978; audiovisual works frequently are works made for
hire. 2 If a Berne member state's domestic duration for cinematographic
works does not exceed the Berne minimum, the United States could,
consistently with Berne, withhold protection for the remaining forty-five
years altogether, or condition protection on fulfilment of a renewal
obligation in the United States, subject to the rule of national treatment. If
the copyright's duration in the country of origin exceeds the Berne minimum,

68. Supra text accompanying notes 18-24.
69. See Berne, supra note 8, art. 7(8) ("however, unless the legislation of that country
otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin of the
work").
70. The rule of national treatment remains as a general background obligation. See 1
RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13,
6.93-.97, at 312-18.
71. Berne, supra note 8, art. 7(2).

72. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 302, 304 (2012).
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but is less than the U.S. duration,73 the Berne Convention calls for the rule of
the shorter term: unless the host state's legislation provides otherwise, the
foreign work will be protected for the length of the term in the country of
origin, rather than for the longer term in the host country.7 4 As a result, the
United States could require a renewal registration for protection to apply
between expiration in the country of origin and expiration of the United
States' ninety-five-year term, or it could simply deny protection for the
remainder of the U.S. term. For that matter, Congress could, consistently
with Berne, require initial and renewal registrations of U.S. and foreign
audiovisual works fifty years (the Berne minimum) following their first
publication or making available to the public.75
3. Rights
At first blush, one might conclude that, given both the breadth of the
Berne minimum substantive rights (as supplemented by TRIPS, the WIPO
Copyright Treaty 76 ("WCT"), and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty7 7 ("WPPT")) and the principle of national treatment, there are no
Berne-plus substantive rights whose exercise might be conditioned by an
obligation to comply with declaratory measures. As our analysis of "Berneplus remedies" indicates, even if the "extent of protection, as well as the
means of redress ' 78 exceed Berne minima, a member state may neither
impose formalities on the availability of the remedy, nor on the scope of the
right; "Berne-plus right" is as much a misnomer as "Berne-plus remedy."
But some might conceptualize an expansion of Berne rights into Berneplus territory through the back door of exceptions. National laws might start
from the exceptions and limitations that Berne either mandates or permits
member states to impose, and then might provide that the otherwise
permissible exception or limitation would not apply if the author or
73. For example, under the EU Term Directive, the duration of protection of
audiovisual works is seventy years from the death of the last survivor of the director, the
screenwriter, or the composer of the score. Council Directive 93/98/EEC, of 29 October
1993 Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art.
2(2), 1990 O.J. (L 290) 9, 11. It is conceivable in a given case that seventy years could elapse
from the last survivor's death before ninety-five years from publication have run out.
74. Berne, supra note 8, art. 7(8). The United States does not currently apply the rule of
the shorter term. See 17 U.S.C. 5 104(a)-(c).
75. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
76. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, available at http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/.
77. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/.
78. Berne, supra note 8, art 5(2); see discussion supra text accompanying note 64.
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rightholder undertook a prescribed declaratory measure. In effect, this
approach would allow authors to "opt out" of an exception or limitation by
declaring their objection to its application.79 Berne article 1Obis(1) arguably
supplies the template, stating:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to
permit the reproduction by the press, the broadcasting or the
communication to the public by wire of articles published in
newspapers or periodicals on current economic, political or
religious topics, and of broadcast works of the same character, in
cases in which the reproduction, broadcastingor such communication thereof is
80
not expressly reserved ....
In other words, the reservation from the exception in effect expands the
author's rights to cover uses which otherwise would permissibly have limited
the scope of the reproduction and communication rights.
Is the express reservation opt-out then a Berne-compatible declaratory
measure that might apply to other otherwise permissible national law
exceptions? The most abrupt answer is "no" because declaratory measures
still condition the "extent of protection": whether formalities come in at the
front end (the availability of the right) or at the back end (the applicability of
an exception), they still shape the scope of protection. A less curt answer is
"probably not." A predecessor version of the article l0bis(l) reservation was
introduced in the original 1886 Berne Act (in then-article 7), and carried over
in the 1908 Berlin Revision (then-article 9(2)), whose travaux explicitly state
that the reservation option was not a formality.8' Since the 1908 Berlin
Revision also established the no-formalities rule, this assertion should carry
some weight. The simplest interpretation characterizes the reservation as "lex

79. This approach differs from the one advocated by the Copyright Principles Project,
which would render an unregistered work more subject to the fair use defense than a work
whose copyright had been registered. See Pamela Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The
Copyright Principles Project: Directionsfor Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1200 (2010)
("Unregistered works would still be protected by copyright law against exact or near-exact
copying that would cause commercial harm, but fair uses might well be broader as to such
works."). This proposal violates Berne article 5(2) because it makes the scope of copyright
dependent on registration: failure to comply with the registration formality means that the
work will be subject to greater incursions on exclusive rights than registered works would be.
80. Berne, supra note 8, art. l0bis(1) (emphasis added).

81. Rapport Prisentia la Confirence au Nom de sa Commission (Louis Renault, President et
Rapporteur), in UNION INTERNATIONALE POUR LA PROTECTION DES (EUVRES LITTERAIRES
14 OCTOBRE AU 14
1908 AvEc LES ACTES DE RATIFICATION, 240 (Bureau de L'Union
Internationale Litt~raire et Artistique 1910) [hereinafter Records of the 1908 Revision Conference].

ET ARTISTIQUES, ACTES DE LA CONFERENCE REUNIE A BERLIN DU

NOVEMBRE
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specialis," 82 a sui generis provision that, although it may derogate from the
default no-formalities norm, does not create a basis for generalization into a
technique for instituting declaratory measures.
A slightly longer answer would emphasize the context in which article
9(2) of the Berlin Revision arose. Although today the provision (now article
l0bis(1)) looks like an opt-out from a limitation on the scope of the rights of
reproduction and communication to the public, and therefore arguably like a
condition on the scope (enjoyment) of Berne minimum rights, at the time of
the provision's drafting, it operated more like a condition on the protection
of Berne-plus subject matter. At that time, the subject matter the provision
addressed-"any article published in a newspaper or periodical"-was widely
believed not to be copyrightable in the first place.8 3 The original Berne Act of
1886 excluded "the news of the day" and "mere items of press information"
from the Convention's subject matter (this exclusion persists in article 2(8) of
the current text). Further, the 1886 Berne and 1896 Paris Revision texts
denied coverage to articles "of political discussion. '8 4 The existence of
international copyright protection for anything published in a newspaper was
thus both questionable and controversial, as the evolution of the text in 1896
and 1908 reveals. The 1896 revision clarified that newspaper serializations of
novels were fully protected;" the need to safeguard serials attests to the taint
periodical publication must have had on works that would otherwise seem
amply copyrightable. The 1908 travaux allude to journalists' contentions that
their writings deserved "greater respect. ' 86 Berlin Act article 9(2) thus was a
compromise measure to provide copyright protection to otherwise excluded
subject matter, provided the rightholder (generally the publisher) reserved the
rights.8 7 In context, therefore, the article lObis(1) is better characterized as a
82. See, e.g., SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
1886-1986, 5.85, at 224 (1987); Alexander Peukert, A
Bipolar Copyright Sstemfor the DigitalNetwork Environment, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1,
66 (2005).
83. For an extended discussion, see Records of the 1908 Revision Conference, supra note 81,
at 249-54.
84. Convention for the Creation of an International Union for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works art. 7, Sept. 9, 1886, 12 Martens (2nd) 173; Additional Act
Modifying the International Copyright Convention of 9 September 1886 art. 7, Apr. 5, 1896,
24 Martens (2nd) 758 [hereinafter Berne 1896 Paris Revision].
85. Berne 1896 Paris Revision, supra note 84, art. 7.
86. Records of the 1908 Revision Conference, supra note 81, at 249 ("Des r~clamations se
sont 6lev~es de diff6rents c6ts dans le sens d'un respect plus grand du droit des
journalistes.'D.
87. It seems to have been assumed that the reservation would have been made by
means of a notice in the newspaper or periodical upon initial publication. See Records of the
1908 Revision Conference, supra note 81, at 253 (quoting German delegation proposal). It is
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:

1606

BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:1583

declaratory measure intended to bring Berne-plus subject matter within the
ambit of protection than as a condition on the scope of protection.
Taking article lObis(1) out of context, for the sake of argument, how
might its express reservation approach be generalized to import declaratory
measures into the scope of rights? It is important to bear in mind that this
technique cannot impose conditions on Berne minimum rights, else it will
fail under the general article 5(2) prohibition. Thus, any exception or
limitation from which an author might opt-out by means of an express
reservation must be an exception or limitation that is already Bernecompatible. The possibility to opt-out should not be what makes an
otherwise impermissible exception or limitation Berne-compatible. If, for
example, a member state either denied the translation right or subjected it to
compulsory licensing (an exception or limitation plainly inconsistent with the
three-step test) unless the author expressly reserved translation rights, then
the author would not enjoy Berne and TRIPS minimum protection without
complying with declaratory obligations. That in turn would violate article 5(2).88
By contrast, a member state exception that applied equally to domestic
and foreign authors and did pass the three-step test, for example, the
retransmission in bars and restaurants of radio broadcasts of dramatic
musical compositions," could perhaps be made subject to an express
reservation condition.9' In that case, the reservation would give the author
greater rights than Berne requires. This type of condition, even if permissible,
seems unlikely to garner enthusiasm among the advocates of "reformalizing"

unlikely that the drafters envisioned further formalization of the reservation through some
kind of governmental filing in the country of origin, much less in multiple countries: such a
requirement would have too closely resembled the multiple formalities rejected from the
outset of the Berne Union.
88. Moreover an exception as broad as the one posited here would fail the "special
case" criterion of the three-step test. See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, at 191 ("Berne Union
states may not go as far as introducing overly broad exceptions of limitations that would
have the effect of subjecting the enjoyment or the exercise of the right as such to situationspecific formalities," because to do so "would oppose the first of the three steps, according
to which an exception or limitation can only be imposed in certain specific cases."). But one
could imagine a succession of more discrete exceptions, each individually a "special case,"
but which cumulatively subjected the enjoyment of the right to compliance with formalities.
See discussion infra Section II.C.3.
89. See Section 110(5) Panel Report, supra note 42, 7.1(a) (holding that the 17 U.S.C. §
110(5) exemption of retransmissions of nondramatic musical compositions violated the
three-step test, but finding the application of the exemption to dramatic musical
compositions to be compatible with the three-step test).
90. For the reasons indicated supra note 87, any such reservation should be a one-time
declaration; the author should not be obliged to file reservations in each country whose
national law allows authors to opt out of Berne-permissible exceptions.
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copyright, because it would give copyright owners more protection, where
the goal of the reformalizers is to reduce protection.
That said, one may acknowledge that the Berne-compatibility of a given
potential exception may not always be clear. A cynical forecaster might
therefore anticipate that the condition's potential application to exceptions of
uncertain Berne-compatibility could make the condition attractive to those
who would cut back copyright protection. Inventive advocacy can expand
the zone of otherwise Berne-compatible exceptions, soon joined on the
slippery slope by exceptions deemed Berne-compatible because they can be
opted-out of. Ultimately, the exclusive rights default could shift to a system
of exceptions from which rightholders must reserve in order to retrieve
exclusive rights.
Here is how the argument would go: first suppose an exception of
arguable consistency with Berne norms, for example, digitization of out-ofprint hardcopy books for nonprofit educational purposes. Second, give
authors or their successors in title the opportunity to oppose the digitization
and dissemination of their books. Third, apply the three-step test as follows:
step one: the class of works covered by the exception constitutes a "special
case" because the class is (arguably) well-defined both as to the works
covered (out-of-print books) and as to the use (nonprofit education). Step
two: there is no "conflict with a normal exploitation of the work" because an
out-of-print book is not being exploited, and because the author or
rightsholder can secure future or derivative exploitations by opting-out; if the
author or rightsholder doesn't opt-out, that must mean there is no actual or
potential market for the work, or that the author or rightsholder doesn't
"care" about exploiting it. Step three: the exception does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate rights of the author because the opt-out enables the
author to avoid all prejudice, unreasonable or otherwise."
91. Member states can satisfy the third step by providing compensation, or equitable
remuneration, for the permitted use, but in our hypothesis there may be no need to
compensate the author for uses she was neither making nor licensing.
I do not wish to imply that an exception for nonprofit educational digitization of
out-of-print books could not pass the three-step test; on the contrary, such an exception,
conditioned on the beneficiary's performance and documentation of a diligent search, may
well be permissible under Berne. Cf.Directive 2012/28/EU, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, arts.
2(1), 6(1), 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5, 9-10 (requiring member states to "provide for an exception
to the right of reproduction and the right of making available to the public.., to ensure that
[certain public-interest organizations] are permitted to use orphan works contained in their
collections in [certain educational and preservative ways]" and providing that "[a] work or a
phonogram shall be considered an orphan work if none of the rightholders in that work or
phonogram is identified or ...located despite a diligent search for the rightholders having
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Is this application of the three-step test consistent with Berne norms? As
a preliminary matter, the proposition that the possibility of opting out lets the
exception pass steps two and three of the Berne article 9(2)/TRIPS article 13
test ignores the details of the opt-out's implementation. Unlike article
lObis(l), which creates a supra-national news reporting exception whose optout may be implemented uniformly throughout the Berne Union, the threestep test allows member states to tailor national exceptions to their own
needs, and not all Union members' needs or policies need be the same.
Thus, member states' exceptions may vary widely, as may the means they
provide for opting out. The proliferation of national opt-outable exceptions
imposes an increasing burden on foreign authors to ascertain the existence
and scope of the local exceptions and to take the steps necessary to avoid
their application.92 An author's failure to opt out of a plethora of national
been carried out and recorded . . ."). But ruling the exception Berne-compatible because it
offers an opt-out is highly problematic, and might well violate Berne if the opt-out
substituted for a diligent search.
92. Recent Canadian legislation offers a good example of the problems of opt-outable
exceptions. Section 30.04 of the "Copyright Modernization Act," S.C. 2012, c. 20, provides:
30.04 (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (5), it is not an infringement of
copyright for an educational institution, or a person acting under the
authority of one, to do any of the following acts for educational or
training purposes in respect of a work or other subject-matter that is
available through the Internet:
(a) reproduce it;
(b) communicate it to the public by telecommunication, if that public
primarily consists of students of the educational institution or other
persons acting under its authority;
(c) perform it in public, if that public primarily consists of students of
the educational institution or other persons acting under its authority;
or
(d) do any other act that is necessary for the purpose of the acts
referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c).
(4) Subsection (1) does not permit a person to do any act described in that
subsection in respect of a work or other subject-matter if
(b) a clearly visible notice - and not merely the copyright symbol prohibiting that act is posted at the Internet site where the work or
other subject-matter is posted or on the work or other subject-matter
itself.
Id. Professor Victor Nabhan has questioned the compatibility of this provision with Berne
article 5(2) and has also emphasized difficulties of implementation: many Internet sites
enumerate permitted uses but do not list prohibited uses (the prohibition of uses falling
outside the authorized list should be implicit); Prof. Nabhan reads the Canadian text to
require specific prohibition; the failure of these websites to set out a distinct prohibition of
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exceptions through their related formalities may simply reflect limited
resources, rather than a rational evaluation of the impact of the exception on
her future exploitation of the work. The more complicated the opting-out,
the less persuasive the empirical assumption underlying scope-conditioning
formalities, that authors do not make the necessary declarations because they
do not "care" about how their works are exploited. Multiple diverse national
opt-outs also impose a burden on users to determine whether, where, and to
what extent unauthorized copyright-implicating acts may be permissible.
Thus, rather than decreasing the title-searching transaction costs, this variant
on formalities could in practice make them more onerous.
Moreover, exceptions can vary over time as well as between member
states. Even if a one-time declaration at the initial public disclosure of a work
may not seem unreasonably burdensome,9 3 either via a copyright registry or
perhaps by means of digital metadata, 94 what of exceptions that member
states enact after the work is disseminated? In such cases, the implementation
of the opt-out appears especially daunting. Even if the member state
educational uses would therefore mean that the website author has not properly opted-out
of the exception. See Victor Nabhan, Linfluence des usages sur le droit des excepions-Canada:prise
en compte par la loi des nouveaux usages et consecrationpar la juriprudence d'un droit d /'excepfion en
faveur de l'usager in L'EFFECTIVITE DES EXCEPTIONS AU DROIT D'AUTEUR ET AUX DROITS
VOISINS: LES USAGES, LA LOI, LA REGULATION (Lamy, forthcoming 2014).
The tension with Berne anti-formality norms becomes all the more apparent when
one considers the practical impact were other countries to enact similar opt-out exceptions.
Suppose, for example, in addition to Canada's requirement that the author of an Internetavailable work specifically prohibit reproduction or communication to the public (etc.) "for
educational or training purposes," that Berne member state X established out-outable
exceptions for public performance in religious services, and Berne member state Y instituted
opt-outable exceptions to the reproduction right for the visually impaired, and Berne
member state Z provided opt-outable exceptions to all exclusive rights for purposes of
promoting mass digitization of out-of-print works. If, as in Canada, a general copyright
notice did not suffice to effect the opt-out, it would seem that authors or rightholders would
be obliged, on a continuing basis, to ascertain what opt-outable exceptions each member
state has enacted and to object specifically to the permitted use. In addition to the content of
the objection, the manner of communicating the opt-out also may become unduly
complicated. For example, for Internet-available content, must the author continually update
her website and the work's metadata to add specific objections as member states add to their
panoply? For works in analog formats, will each member state create a registry of objections?
Will there be a centralized registry for opt-outs, perhaps administered by WIPO? The more
one contemplates the implementation of national opt-outs, the more apparent their
incompatibility with Berne norms.
93. It seems the drafters expected that the opt-out from the news reporting exception
would take the form of a declaration in the pages of the newspaper upon its publication. See
supra note 87.
94. Indeed, authors should be encouraged to provide rights-management information,
and technologists should help authors achieve that end.
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provides an effective means for authors to take exception, such a system
would demand that authors remain constantly on guard for the loss of rights
throughout the world as new exceptions come into force-a degree of
vigilance that is even more demanding than registration ab initio.9" Thus, if
the opt-out is what makes the exception Berne-permissible, then perhaps the
exception cannot apply to works created before the exception's enactment.
But if prospective-only opt-out requirements alleviate the unfairness that
would result from requiring old works to carry new declarations,
prospectivity also seems to undermine the local policy concerns that
prompted adoption of the exception because a prospective-only exception
will not facilitate owner-identification and rights-clearance of older works.
Rights+ formalities are undesirable for three other reasons as well. First,
even leaving aside the plausibility of is premises, allowing the possibility of an
opt-out to bear on the outcome of the three-step test is particularly
problematic in light of the first step. The essence of the opt-out proposal is
that, so long as the class is narrowly defined, the opt-out may satisfy (or
override) the second two "steps" and the first step's "special case" limitation
itself may be eluded through a series of individually well-defined exceptions.
Taken separately, each exception might constitute a "special case." But in the
95. For example, if the opt-out were contained in the copy's metadata, the author
cannot retrieve already-dispersed copies to amend their metadata, and (constantly) altering
the metadata for new copies would simply cause confusion among users. This difficulty has
already been noted with respect to metadata for opting out of copyright protection;
transposing the opt-out from protection to exceptions (in effect, requiring the author to optin to full copyright protection), would appear to pose the same problem. Cf. Association
Litt~raire et Artistique Internationale ("ALAI"), Memorandum on Creative Commons Licenses
(2006), http://www.alai.org/en/resolutions-and-positions.html. The ALAI states:
While [the author] can cease to offer the work herself with the license, or
can offer a more restrictive CC license directly from her website, she will
probably not be able to stop the circulation of copies previously
accompanied by prior terms of the license. In that case, it would seem that
different versions of CC licenses with regard to the same work might
simultaneously be in force.
Id. The Creative Commons explains that:
CC licenses are not revocable. Once something has been published under
a CC license, licensees may continue using it according to the license
terms for the duration of applicable copyright and similar rights. As a
licensor, you may stop distributing under the CC license at any time, but
anyone who has access to a copy of the material may continue to
redistribute it under the CC license terms. While you cannot revoke the
license, CC licenses do provide a mechanism for licensors to ask that
others using their material remove the attribution information.
Frequently Asked Questions, CREATIVE COMMONs, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Fre
quently.AskedQuestions#What if I changemymindaboutusing_a CCicense.3F.
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aggregate the exceptions would significantly erode the formally exclusive
right. This incremental approach to the first step would thus eviscerate the
test, effectively allowing significant incursions on authors' rights, so long as
they are accomplished piecemeal through the back door of exceptions.
Second, the more complicated the implementation of the opt-out, the
more it resembles the multiple formalities banned from the outset of the
Berne Convention. As discussed above, integrating the opt-out into the
three-step test opens the door to the enactment of a variety of member statenecessarily congruent,
specific exceptions and requirements-not
coordinated, or even consistent-which risk unduly burdening authors (and
users) and seem increasingly like the "trap for the unwary" that rightly
brought formalities into disrepute.9 6
Third, large and/or sophisticated copyright owners may understand the
need systematically to opt out of exceptions and might have the means to
undertake the necessary declarations. Smaller copyright owners and
individual authors may not understand the opt-out regime (nor, depending
on how it was implemented, be in a position to assume its burdens). The optout therefore would perpetuate, and aggravate, the disparate impact that
formalities systems already wreak on individual creators.9" As a general
proposition, an exception should pass three-step muster on its own merits; if
it does not, then, as this analysis has shown, adding an opt-out feature will
not save the exception from Berne-incompatibility.
III.

OWNERSHIP

A.

DECLARATORY DUTIES PERTAINING TO COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP
ARE NOT BERNE-BANNED "FORMALITIES"

Berne article 5(2) prohibits formalities that limit the "enjoyment or
exercise" of copyright. It does not address declaratory measures concerning
ownership of rights. Yet those measures may be the most pertinent to titlesearching. If I am correct that Berne bars measures that condition how a right
is exercised, but not who exercises it, then member states may achieve many
96. Presentation of Julie Sigall, at the Berkeley Technology Law Journal Symposium:
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright for the Internet Age? (Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://media.
law.berkeley.edu/qtmedia/BCLT/2013copyright/Sessionl.mp3.
97. Note that a declaratory condition on a user's exercise of an exception, such as an
obligation to document a diligent search in order to qualify for an "orphan works"
limitation, see Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
March 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, art. 3(5), 2012 O.J. (L 299) 5, 9,
would not be a "formality" in the sense of Berne article 5(2) because the beneficiary of the
exception, not the author or rightholder, incurs the declaratory obligation.
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of the positive, rights clearance-facilitating goals of formalities, without
violating international norms.9" Moreover, member states may apply not only
carrots but also sticks to encourage compliance with ownership-related
formal or declaratory obligations, by making the validity of a transfer of
rights contingent on fulfilling those obligations.
For example, many (probably most) member states deny effect to
transfers of exclusive rights that are not in writing and signed by the author
or other transferor. Commentators agree that this author-protective
constraint is not a Berne-forbidden "formality." 99 Similarly, national
copyright-contract rules that, for example, condition the validity of a transfer
of particular rights on the specific mention of future new technology
rights,' 0 or on separately stating and providing proportional remuneration
for each mode of exploitation,'0 ' are formal protections of the author as the
weaker party, and are not "formalities" in the Berne sense.
In addition to mandating a signed writing to effectuate the transfer, U.S.
copyright law seeks to encourage recordation of transfers through a
combination of evidentiary advantages and prospective invalidity in the event
of conflicting transfers: the first-filing bona fide purchaser for value prevails
over the earlier transferee.0 2 I would more boldly posit going beyond the

98. Accord Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention

and the UnitedStates CopyrightLaw, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499, 544 (1967).
99. See, e.g., VAN GOMPEL, supra note 4, 5.3.2.2, at 204. van Gompel argues that:
These requirements essentially determine the way in which the author can
legally transfer his copyright. Rather than affecting the enjoyment or the
exercise of copyright, therefore, they establish the extent to which the
author can exploit his rights. As much as the Berne Convention permits
contracting states to preclude the assignment of copyright or create
certain presumption of assignment, it allows them to establish the
condition under which copyright can be assigned, including the
requirements of form relating to the validity of a contract.
Id. 1 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 13, 6.105, at 326-27.
100. See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE art. L131-6 (Fr.); Gesetz uber

Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz) [Copyright Act], as
amended, § 31a (Ger.).
101. See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE art. L131-3 (Fr.) (each right
granted must be the object of explicit mention and delimited as to scope, purpose, place and
duration); id. art. L131-4 (requirement of proportional participation in revenues from the
grant).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 205(c) ("recordation as constructive notice"); (d) ("priority between
conflicting transfers'). Recordation statutes of this kind are hardly unique to copyright; they
figure importantly in transfers of real property and chattels. Seegeneralyl BENITO ARRUIqADA,
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE: THEORY AND POLICY OF

CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES

(2012), reprinted in THOMAS W.

PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 905 (2d ed. 2012).

MERRILL & HENRY

E.

SMITH,

2013]
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hypothesis of conflicting transfers to make the validity of the transfer itself
contingent on the transferee's recordation of the contract or a note or
memorandum of the transfer."' 13 While a duty to record a transfer of
exclusive rights performs a more public-regarding function (to facilitate
rights clearance) than does the requirement of a signed writing, in neither
case does the sanction of invalidity deprive the author of copyright
protection (on the contrary, in some instances it may have the effect of
returning the rights to her).
B.

IF CONDITIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE TRANSFER ON ITS
RECORDATION Is BERNE-PERMISSIBLE, IS IT A GOOD IDEA?

Of all the declaratory measures (whether or not they are "formalities" in
the Berne sense), the one most likely to facilitate rights-clearance is
recordation. The debate over "orphan works" has shown that the most
important impediment to finding right owners is the lack of a reliable chain
of tide.' A work may have been registered, and its registration renewed, but
compliance with those formalities does little good if there is no record of
subsequent changes in ownership. An invalidity sanction for noncompliance
with an obligation to record transfers of exclusive rights0 5 would appear to
furnish a strong, Berne-compatible incentive to the creation of reliable tidesearching records,0 6 but how would it work? Devilish details in the
103. Cf 17 U.S.C. §5 204(a) (transfer not valid unless "an instrument of conveyance, or a
note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights
conveyed .. ."), 205(c) (setting minimum requirements for recorded document to provide
constructive notice to public). See also In re AEG Acquisition Corp., 161 Bankr. 50 (BAP 9th
Cir. 1993) (failure to perfect security interest in foreign films by registering work and
recording security interest with U.S. Copyright Office; Berne Convention works not
exempted from requirement to perfect security interest).

104. See U.S.

COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN

WORKS

26-34 (2006)

(describing obstacles to tide searching).
105. Some states make recordation a condition of the validity of transfer of tide to
automobiles. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-72(b). The statute states:
In order to assign or transfer title or interest in any motor vehicle
registered under the provisions of this Article, the owner shall execute in
the presence of a person authorized to administer oaths an assignment
and warranty of tide on the reverse of the certificate of title in form
approved by the Division, including in such assignment the name and
address of the transferee; and no title to any motor vehicle shall pass or
vest until such assignment is executed and the motor vehicle delivered to
the transferee.
Id.
106. A more modest sanction, making recordation a prerequisite to suit, would run afoul
of Berne article 5(2) because it would be a precondition to enforcement. The 1976 Copyright
Act's original section 205(d) included a pre-suit recordation obligation, which was eliminated
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implementation of the duty include costs and deadlines, gaps in the titlesearching record, and the application of the requirement to works of nonU.S. origin.
1. PracticalConcerns
a) Cost
At the moment, the cost of recording a document in the Copyright
Office is $105 for one document, and an additional $30 for each group of ten
documents.1 7 This fee may not daunt transferees who are commercial actors,
but one should inquire whether there is a class of transferees for whom the
fees are a disincentive to recordation. If recordation is a prerequisite to
validity of the transfer, it may be necessary to introduce some flexibility into
the fee schedule. Current realities in the Copyright Office sound another
somber note: not all recordation records are digitized or searchable online. 8
For the recordation records to perform their desired rights-clearing function,
they must be fully accessible. Moreover, the information to be recorded
should be standardized and should clearly identify the works at issue and the
rights transferred. Fairness, too, may require a well-functioning recordation
system before a transferee incurs the risk of invalidity for failure to record. 109
b) Timing
If the validity of the transfer will turn on its recordation, how much time
may elapse until the transferee records?' And what is the event that starts

when the United States joined Berne. See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S.
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 513, 566 (1986) ("[w]ith respect
to works of foreign origin, section 205(d) is incompatible with Berne, since it requires
recordation as a prerequisite to suit and thereby may affect the exercise of copyright"); S.
Rep. No. 100-352, at 26 (1988). Ironically the more draconian sanction, invalidating the
transfer, appears more consistent with Berne than a sanction that preserves the transfer but
deprives the non-recording transferee of standing to sue.

107. Calculating Fees for Recording Documents in the Copyrght Office,
http://www.copyright.gov/fls/sl4d.pdf (outlining fees for recording documents in the
copyright office).
108. See Recordation of Tranifers and Other Documents, Copyright Office Circular 12 at 6,
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circl2.pdf.
109. Whether recordation should remain centralized in the Copyright Office, or be
distributed across a variety of databases is beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. Pamela
Samuelson & Members of the CPP, The Copyrght Princibles Project: Direcionsfor Reform, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1203-05 (2010) (recommending "networked and interoperable

private registries").
110. See generally Alan Latman, The Recordation of Copyright Assignments and Licenses,
Copyright Study No. 19 (1958), repinted in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 761, 766-74 (1963)
(addressing grace periods under the 1909 Act and proposals for reform).
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the clock running? Execution of the transfer would seem a normal starting
point, but "execution" may not mean the same thing as signing an
agreement. As the Copyright Office's inquiry into "Gap Grants" revealed,
agreements to transfer rights may be entered into before the work has been
created."' The Office determined that the grant was not "executed" until the
work that was the object of the transfer of rights came into being."2 By the
same token, the recordation obligation should vest at the date of conclusion
of a transfer respecting an extant work, or, for grants in anticipation of a
work's creation, at the date of creation.
As for deadlines, section 205(d) allows a grace period of one month for
transfers executed in the United States, and two months for transfers
executed abroad, before a first-filing subsequent bona fide transferee will be
awarded title despite the prior transfer. Similar deadlines might apply to the
validity of the transfer in general (not just in the case of conflicting transfers).
But it will be important to ensure that judicial interpretation of the
recordation prerequisite to validity does not dilute the duty's prescriptive
force. Inconsistent case law under the section 204(a) requirement of a signed
writing serves as a warning. Some courts construing that obligation perceive
the writing simply as a confirmation of an oral agreement which effectively
transferred the rights, and therefore tolerate even years of delay before the
agreement is reduced to writing. Others, correctly applying the statutory
language, rule that there is no transfer without a writing, and therefore
demand closer contemporaneity between the agreement and its expression in
13

writing.

111. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF GAP GRANTS UNDER THE
TERMINATION PROVISIONS OF TITLE 17 (2010), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/gap-

grant-analysis.pdf.
112. At issue was the terminability under 5 203 of the 1976 Act of agreements
concluded before the effective date of the 1976 Act with respect to works created thereafter.

See id.
113. Compare Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 2011); 3 Melville
B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 5 10.03[A] [31 at nn. 20-22 (rev. ed.
2009) (treating § 204(a) as a mere statute of frauds, not affecting the validity of the transfer),
with Konigsberg Int'l Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994) (treating § 204(a) as more
than a statute of frauds, but a requirement for validity); Pamfiloffv. Giant Records, Inc., 794
F. Supp. 933, 936-37 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (same); 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:106 ("Although
[§ 204(a) is] occasionally referred to as a Statute of Frauds provision, this is an incomplete
description.").
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2. Gaps in the Record
a) Initial Registration
The invalidity sanction attaches to failure to record transfers of tide to
exclusive rights. A title search-aiding record of a transfer requires a starting
point to evidence the initial title holder from whom the chain of title springs.
But an obligation to record initial title looks like a registration requirement, a
formality that does run afoul of Berne if the sanction for noncompliance
divests or disables the copyright. It may nonetheless be possible to achieve
registration without punishing authors. Recall that the sanction for nonrecordation burdens not the initial tide holder (the author), but the grantee. If
the author has voluntarily registered the copyright in the work, then the
starting point will be in place. In the absence of an initial registration, the
14
grantee should effect both the registration and the recordation of transfer.'
The Copyright Act and current Copyright Office practices enable this gapfilling by the transferee: Section 409(5), which details the contents of the
registration form, provides: "if the copyright claimant is not the author, [the
claimant shall include] a brief statement of how the claimant obtained
' 115
ownership of the copyright."

114. See Latman, supra note 110, at 776-77. Latman argues:
[it has been suggested that the present system of registering copyright
claims be dropped in favor of a more elaborate approach to the
recordation of transfers of copyright. The key to an effective recording
system is its completeness, and ideally all links in a chain of tide should be
placed on record. In the absence of a basic registry system, identifying the
work, the first owner of the copyright, the date from which the term is
computed, and other pertinent information, the recording of transfers
would often fail to identify the work covered by the transfer, the term of
copyright, and especially the derivation of the transferee's claim to
ownership. On the other hand, it may be contended that it is asking too
much of an assignee not only to record his own assignment but also to
register the initial claim and to record any intervening assignments.
Id.
115. Registration forms, available on the Copyright Office website, provide further
detail. For example, on Form TX, the instructions for filling out "space 4" state:
Transfer: The statute provides that, if the copyright claimant is not the
author, the application for registration must contain "a brief statement of
how the claimant obtained ownership of the copyright." If any copyright
claimant named in space 4 is not an author named in space 2, give a brief
statement explaining how the claimant(s) obtained ownership of the
copyright. Examples: "By written contract"; "Transfer of all rights by
author"; "Assignment"; "By will." Do not attach transfer documents or
other attachments or riders.
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So long as the transfer remains unrecorded (and assuming no
supervening recorded conflicting transfer) the grantee would not be an
"owner" of copyright. But the signed writing could be treated as effecting a
nonexclusive license, much as a nonexclusive license may be inferred from
conduct or oral agreement." 6 Because the license is in writing, however, it
would survive a subsequent recorded transfer of exclusive rights, while an
unwritten nonexclusive license would be extinguished."' Arguably, since a
recordation record that did not disclose the existence of a prior nonexclusive
license could mislead the purchaser as to the effective scope of the rights
granted, it would be more consistent with the present proposal were the
persistence of a nonexclusive license against a subsequent grant of exclusive
rights to be conditioned on the license's recordation. But a purchaser may
protect herself by requiring the transferor to warrant the absence of exclusive
and nonexclusive licenses." 8 And because a nonexclusive licensee lacks
standing to sue," 9 the non-recordation of a nonexclusive license does not
prejudice users. The nonexclusive licensee would be obliged to join the
copyright-retaining licensor to the infringement action, but, at least assuming
an initial registration or prior recordation of transfer, the public will be on
notice of who owns the relevant rights.
b) Transfers by Operation of Law
Even with a recordation prerequisite to the validity of a transfer, other
gaps in the chain of title may result from transfers by operation of law.
Examples of such transfers include: divorce; inheritance by intestate
succession and perhaps by will; 20 corporate mergers, acquisitions,
Form TX, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, available at http://www.copyright.gov/

forms/formtx.pdf.
116. See, e.g., Effects Associates v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1990).
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(e).
118. See, e.g., PERLE & WILLIAMS ON PUBLISHING LAW § 2.06 (Mark A. Fisher et al.,
eds., 2010 Supp.) ('Writer has not previously.., encumbered" the rights conveyed.).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (owners of copyright have standing to sue). A non-exclusive
licensee is not an "owner." See, e.g., Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137,
1144 (9th Cir. 2008). In Sybersound, the court held that:
Under copyright law, only copyright owners and exclusive licensees of
copyright may enforce a copyright or license. Therefore, third party
strangers and nonexclusive licensees cannot bring suit to enforce a
copyright, even if an infringer is operating without a license to the
detriment of a nonexclusive licensee who has paid full value for his
license.
Id. (citations omitted).
120. 17 U.S.C. 5 201(d)(1); see, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of
God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding bequest of all real and personal
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restructuring;"' and involuntary transfers in bankruptcy proceedings.'2 2 The
regimes governing these transfers may include their own recordation
requirements; perhaps those records could be linked to copyright records.
Failing that, it would be desirable to consider the circumstances under which
it would be appropriate to impose an additional burden of copyright
recordation on the trustee in bankruptcy, testamentary executor, and other
transferees by operation of law. In any event, the duty to record would
continue to bind one who acquires exclusive rights from the transferee.
Authors' statutory reversion rights pose an instance akin to transfers by
operation of law. The present Copyright Act recognizes the important public
interest in knowing whether an author has reclaimed her rights under the
section 203 termination provision (as well as under the section 304(c) and (d)
extended renewal termination rights), because the Act requires authors (or
others qualified to terminate) to record in the Copyright Office a copy of the
notice of termination "before the effective date of termination, as a condition
to its taking effect."' 23 Thus, recordation is already a condition of the validity
of the statutory reversion.
What of contractual reversions, such as provided in out-of-print clauses
or as the parties may in any event agree at some time after the execution of
the transfer? Or for that matter, what of a time-limited grant of rights? In the
last case, the recordation of the initial grant will show its duration, which
should put the public on notice that after that time (assuming no subsequent
grant), the rights have returned to the author. But with respect to reversions
of rights initially granted for the full term of copyright, should a recordation

property sufficient to transfer copyright); Forster Music Publishers Inc. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 62 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (applying state law of intestate succession to
copyright under 1909 Act).
121. See, e.g., U.S. Home Corp. v. R.A. Kot Homes, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d 971, 975 (D.
Minn. 2008) (holding that corporate merger transferred copyright by "operation of law"
under § 204(a) "without any 'further act or deed' on the part [of] the surviving company"); .
Cincom Systems v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 432 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding infringement
on copyright by surviving corporate entity following merger with licensee of copyright,
where license was non-assignable; noting that "[f]ederal common law governs questions with
respect to the assignability of a patent or copyright license").
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (permitting involuntary transfer under bankruptcy laws);
Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636 (D. Md. 2006)
(holding that in federal copyright law, "transfers by operation of law are expressly limited to
voluntary transfers, except in bankruptcy proceedings.'); see also Kunkel v. Jasin, 420 F.
App'x 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that a debtor in bankruptcy may not register a
copyright in his own name; since the author's copyright passed to the bankruptcy estate, only
the estate may register the copyright).
123. 17 U.S.C. % 203(a)(4)(A); 304(c)(4)(A), (d)(1).
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obligation condition the author's retrieval of her rights?1'2 The public interest
in knowing who owns the rights does not wane with the change in the legal
basis of the reversion. On the other hand, the recordation obligation, posited
in its initial guise, did not divest authors-if anything, the author retained
whatever rights her transferee failed to record. Given the remedial role of
reversion, we might be reluctant to make the author's rights depend on
recordation. In fact, however, we already impose such an obligation with
respect to statutory termination rights, where the author's moral claims to
reversion may be even more compelling than for contractual reversions,
precisely because statutory reversions are designed to make up for authors'
generally weaker bargaining position.12 Nonetheless, lest authors' incipient
reversionary interests in current contracts be frustrated by failure to record
the revesting of the rights, any mandatory obligation that contractual
reversions be recorded should be purely prospective, applicable only to
contracts executed after the effective date of a statutory126 amendment
imposing recordation as a condition of the validity of the grant.

124. Or for a negotiated reversion occurring before the expiration of the duration of the
grant covering less than the full term of copyright. See Daniel Gervais & Dashiell Renaud,
The Future of United States Copyrght Formalities: Why We Should Priorifize Recordaion, and How To
Do It, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1459, 1492-93 (2013).
125. See id. 5 203(a)(5) ("Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary.'); § 304(c)(5) (same).
126. To the extent that the principal contractual reversion results from "out of print"
clauses, the gradual disappearance of these clauses from digital-age publishing contracts may
moot the issue. See The Future of Electronic Publishing:A PanelDiscussion, 25 CoLUMJ.L. & ARTS
91, 112 (2002) (statement of Lois F. Wasoff, Vice President & Corporate Counsel,
Houghton Mifflin Company, Chair, Copyright Committee, Association of American
Publishers) (hypothesizing that "we are going to start to see 'out of print' clauses being
replaced by 'minimum revenue' clauses" in which "if the publisher is generating less than a
certain amount of revenue, the author can demand the rights back"); Stephen Manes, Sufing
and Stealing: An Author's Perpective, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 127, 132 (1999). Manes
states:
Authors are beginning to demand and receive radically changed out-ofprint clauses that allow the author to demand a reversion of rights in any
year that the sales figures or dollar volume from the book fail to reach a
particular level, or by simply doing what hardcover publishers are smart
enough to do with their paperback sublicenses: limiting the licenses to a
fixed period.
Id. Cf Lionel Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg, "The Sole Right ... Shall Return to the Authors".-AngloAmerican Authors' Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporay U.S. Copyright, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1554 n.382 (2010) (observing "publishers, rather than authors,
appear to have had the most to gain from allowing the author to recapture her copyright" in
order to reduce, among other things, "the expenses of... business tax on inventory items[]
and costs of warehousing and concomitant efforts for 'tighter inventory control,'" burdens
that are less significant in the digital context (citations omitted)). If the revesting of rights
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3. Application to Berne Works of Non-US. Origin
Finally, how would a recordation obligation apply to transfers of U.S.
rights in works of non-U.S. origin? By virtue of the Berne Convention and
other multilateral instruments, a Berne Union author, upon the work's
creation or first publication anywhere in the Berne Union, initially owns the
copyright in the work in every other Berne Union country. 27 So a French
author owns the U.S. rights in her work from the outset, long before she may
in fact exploit them (if ever). Under what circumstances should a U.S.
recordation obligation apply to the French author's transfer of rights for a
territory that includes the United States? If the transferee is a U.S. resident,
the U.S. recordation obligation should apply (with respect to the transfer of
U.S. rights), just as it would for a transfer of U.S. rights from a U.S. author. If
the transferee is not a U.S. resident, and if the transfer covers multiple
territories, recordation as a prerequisite to validity might seem more
problematic from a practical perspective. That said, anyone acquiring U.S.
rights, whether local or foreign, ought already, as part of due diligence, to be
consulting the recordation of tite in the Copyright Office; requiring that the
acquirer in turn record does not seem a significant additional burden. In any
event, the current Copyright Act contemplates foreign transferees because it
allows them an additional month before a subsequent bona fide acquirer's
recordation can preempt their transfer.'28 But there is a difference between
recordation to negate the risk of conflicting transfers and recordation as a
condition of the validity of the transfer of the U.S. rights 129 ab initio. The
latter approach may place too high a burden on foreign transferees,
particularly if their imminent likelihood of exploiting the U.S. rights is at best
inchoate, or if the work has not already been the object of a Copyright Office

follows a rescission of the agreement, the rescission might be treated as a new contract that
the parties should record.
127. Berne, supra note 8, arts. 3, 5(1).
128. 17 U.S.C. § 409(5).
129. While a contract transferring multiterritorial rights may as a whole be governed by
the law chosen by the parties, or in the absence of a choice of law, by the law of the country
with the closest connection to the contract, see, for example, American Law Institute,
American Law Institute: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES §
315(1)(2) (2008), the laws of the countries for which the rights are transferred will apply to
determine the validity of the transfers, id. 314; Corcovado Music Corp. v. Hollis Music,
Inc., 981 F.2d 679 (2nd Cir. 1993). See also PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 151 (2d ed. 2010) (arguing that local recording systems and
priority rules receive "primacy over conflicting contract terms" on the grounds of "deference
to local judgments in the efficient operation of a title priority system" and "absence of
universal treaty agreements governing priorities").
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registration. A middle course would be to require a foreign transferee whose
grant explicitly covers the United States to effect the recordation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

One critic of international copyright norms has complained that the
claim "Can't do it because it's a Berne violation" is "an all-too-common
refrain to torpedo numerous ideas for improving or modernizing our
copyright system."13 The Berne Convention and related treaty obligations
may constrain the implementation of good ideas for the copyright system (so
far as the ideas apply to Union authors). Happily, however, our treaty
obligations also frustrate efforts to implement bad ideas that would
expropriate (foreign) authors.
"Formalities," in the Berne sense of prohibited conditions on the
existence, scope, and exercise of copyright, are bad ideas because they further
confiscatory policies, deny the dignity of creation, and confine copyright to
its economic dimension. 3 ' Declaratory measures, which advance the
considerable public benefit of establishing and maintaining chains of tide, not
only are good ideas "for improving.., our copyright system," they also are
consistent with our international obligations.'32 The principal measure this
Article proposes, conditioning validity of transfer of copyright on
recordation of a note or memorandum of the transfer, is Berne-compatible
because, while Berne protects the interests of successors in tide, it does not
regulate the means by which one becomes a successor in tide. That is for the
member state whose law governs the transfer.
Reliable tide records benefit both the public and authors by reducing
search costs and facilitating mutually beneficial transactions. Moreover, by
easing the flow of information about copyright ownership, Berne-compatible
declaratory obligations could-without penalizing authors-alleviate the ills
that purportedly justify calls for the return of confiscatory formalities. Rights
of ostensibly little value to their owners-because they relate to works that
are only minimally original, or too obscure, or too old-are much less
130. Edward Lee, Copyright, Death, and Taxes, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 3 (2012)
(citing, inter alia, Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatogy Copyrght Formalities:A
Love/Hate Relaionship, 33 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 311 (2010)).
131. Niva Elkin-Koren, Can FormalitiesSave the Public Domain? Reconsidering Formaliiesfor
the 2010s, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1537 (2013).
132. By contrast, the "new-style formalities" proposal advanced by Sprigman not only
would penalize authors but also relies upon the tendentious assertion that the Berne
Convention does not require injunctive relief. Sprigman, supra note 2, at 558-59. As
discussed above, this runs counter to both the background norms of copyright and the
mandate of Berne and TRIPS. Supra notes 41-52 and accompanying text.
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problematic if their owners can readily be found and the rights easily
acquired. Were rights-clearance no longer to impose high transactions costs,
the remaining impetus for reformalizing copyright would plainly emerge: for
copyright reformalizers, "new-style" or otherwise, the fault lies not in
copyright's alleged unmanageability, but in the current contours of copyright
itself.

